In the wake of the regime's fall in Damascus, it is necessary to recall several historical facts and pivotal political milestones that contributed to the formation of modern Syria. First among these is that no political entity called Syria with its current borders, or anything approximating this territory, existed before World War I and the French Mandate. While geographical regions bore this name, they were not political entities of demographic significance, as ancient Syrian societies suffered from wars, migrations, and subordination, eventually contracting under the dominance of neighboring empires such as the Greek/Hellenic and Persian since the seventh century BC.
We need not delve further back into history as it lacks political and scientific utility. Subsequently, communities in this region endured varying degrees of Roman and Byzantine persecution, to the extent that periods of war exceeded times of peace. Most areas of present-day Syria were known as the Levant during the Islamic era. Its communities enjoyed relative freedom and stability, as Christianity remained the majority faith until the late Abbasid period, according to most Islamic sources. However, they faced persecution as religion was exploited by local rulers and their masters in distant capitals, as well as invaders. Eventually, the social and demographic structures of the Levant were devastated by the Crusader wars.
What we aim to convey as condensed historical knowledge forms an entry point to understanding Syria's formation and its political development contexts, as current events are an extension and reproduction of the past. To such an extent that modern Syria's formation did not deviate from this pattern - wars contributed to shaping its structure, and its birth began with the war known as the "Arab Revolt," which was essentially an armed movement led by Arab Ottoman officers under the banner of Faisal bin Al-Hussein Sharif against the Ottoman Sultanate, while simultaneously maintaining an alliance with the British. Regardless of this war's implications and symbolism, it was a war led by a Hijazi family from outside Syria, serving as a clear indication of Syrian society's inability at that time to form a unified and strong civilian leadership that could speak for its communities to achieve independence and sovereignty.
Despite disagreements over the methodology of writing modern Syrian history, there remains a consensus that the civil and political aspects, as well as societal unity across Syrian regions, were virtually absent. Though this unity was achieved relatively during the resistance against French occupation/mandate for a brief period, this resistance was accompanied by lengthy debates over several fundamental issues such as inclusive Syrian identity and the transition from local governments to a central government in Damascus. Damascus served as Syria's capital during the years (1918-1920), then Aleppo became the capital of three federations, which were the statelets of Damascus, Aleppo, and the Alawites during the years (1920-1922).
However, it is certain that the agreement between Britain and Kemalist Turkey's government, along with President Shukri al-Quwatli's (1891-1967) experience and flexibility, helped establish Syria and Lebanon's map in its current form. Without the cooperation of political movements and influential figures in the regions east of the Euphrates with President Quwatli, the war in Al-Jazeera between insurgents and Damascus government police would not have ended. This uprising, which demanded independence/autonomy, continued between 1933 and 1946. In other words, it would have been difficult for the regions east of the Euphrates to join the modern Syrian state territorially and socially after the withdrawal of French and British forces in 1946, if not for the belief in societal commonalities and the pursuit of a national political partnership.
It is worth remembering that political life in Syria after independence was also a series of external and internal wars. The Palestine War erupted in 1948, from which internal power struggles derived. Military officers fought over power and disagreed on armament methods while paying lip service to the crucial cause of reclaiming Palestine. These differences manifested in internal conflicts within army factions and exploded with the Kurdish officer Husni al-Za'im's coup in 1949, seizing power in Damascus in the first military coup. During his movement and era, the violent power struggle intensified, taking on national, sectarian, and regional Syrian colors. Within months, al-Za'im himself was overthrown and immediately executed along with the Prime Minister, the civilian legal scholar Dr. Muhsin al-Barazi, both of whom were notables from the city of Hama.
The event was so bloody and had such a nationalist political conflict background that some Damascus newspapers announced at the time: "the end of Kurdish rule in Damascus." On this occasion, while respecting all opinions and courtesies that describe Syria's history as a journey of harmony, love, and accord, we believe that political conflicts were raging among the ruling elites along nationalist, sectarian, and regional lines from the very first days of independence, and even before. These continued until Hafez al-Assad's rise to power in 1970, which gave internal political violence and its wars an even more dangerous dimension, leading to absolute rule through executing his opponents and completely monopolizing power and national resources. The repressive apparatus, which he expanded and enlarged, became so brutal that it simultaneously deformed and preyed upon Syrian society. After his death, his son Bashar inherited power in 2000 with explicit support from the United States (which expressed its position and explicit desire for a smooth transfer of power from father to son). Another dangerous turn and development occurred in the course of the Syrian civil war that had been smoldering under the ashes, erupting as a result of the oppression of Syrian communities and in response to the Arab Spring variables, as well as external interventions and conflicts after 2011.
Despite the bloodiness of the conflict, the brutality of the repression, and its long duration, neither the military nor civilian opposition forces were able to decide the battle and overcome the regime until recent days. The battle led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies (in the Military Operations Management under the title of Deterring Aggression) was decisive, beginning on November 26th until the regime's fall and the defeat of its leaders at dawn on December 8th, 2024. The entire world was astonished by this quick and decisive result of the battle, and many observers now consider it the final episode in the Syrian war that has continued for decades. Are they right? Will that be achieved? What is the degree of success in opening a new page for civil peace and establishing a civilian system? These are the urgent questions today that every Syrian articulates among dozens of questions.
Whatever the case, and before contributing to the answer as an initial assessment, the distinction of this lightning battle lies in that it represents an unprecedented political achievement in modern Syrian history. Regardless of the circumstances, the degree of various parties' sponsorship of the power transition process, and efforts to create common ground between active forces within Syria and prevent neighboring countries' intervention, concerns still surround the political transition process led by HTS and its hastily formed government under Mohammed Al-Bashir's presidency.
What's important for the politically astute reader, and for those who approach this momentous event with a complex and dynamic mindset, is that this change occurred as the fruit of accumulated political struggles over half a century, and as a result of the tireless work of generations of Syrian activists who sacrificed everything precious - lives and wealth - to change this authoritarian regime. It's also important to objectively evaluate the process of uprooting the authoritarian regime from its foundations, recognizing its exceptional political significance. The transitional nature of HTS and its allies' assumption of power under Ahmed Al-Shara's leadership must be understood, as their success is summarized in ending one of the worst military, authoritarian, chauvinistic, and sectarian regimes in the region and the world. However, the legitimate question remains about the new authority's ability to simultaneously end the Syrian wars and plant the seeds of civil peace. Will this battle truly be the conclusion of the Syrian wars or the beginning of a series of new ones?
Undoubtedly, the transitional phase is extremely complex, and the Syrian tragedy is unparalleled worldwide. Therefore, success in ending the Syrian wars requires building on proven fundamentals such as the rule of law, respecting the uniqueness and diversity of local communities, working to secure their rights including the right to self-governance, as well as establishing public freedoms and maintaining human rights. This is difficult to achieve currently, unless the transitional phase leadership is formed from national elites - half wise men and half angels - meaning the necessity of combining honest national expertise with clean and noble political elites who rise above sharp polarization and hatred. Such individuals are abundantly available in Syrian communities. Otherwise, the compass points to the battle for toppling power in Damascus being merely the first Syrian war on a path of long turmoil that will destroy what remains of the country and displace the other segments of society. It will be the beginning of internal conflicts that will only end with the complete ruin of the country, transforming it into barren land and perhaps relatively achieving the saying: "a land without people."
Azad Ahmed Ali is a Kurdish researcher from Syria and author of dozens of books in Arabic and Kurdish. He received his PhD in the History of Engineering from Aleppo University and was head of Rudaw Research Center from 2014 to 2017. He has served as editor-in-chief of Al-Hiwar magazine since 1993.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
We need not delve further back into history as it lacks political and scientific utility. Subsequently, communities in this region endured varying degrees of Roman and Byzantine persecution, to the extent that periods of war exceeded times of peace. Most areas of present-day Syria were known as the Levant during the Islamic era. Its communities enjoyed relative freedom and stability, as Christianity remained the majority faith until the late Abbasid period, according to most Islamic sources. However, they faced persecution as religion was exploited by local rulers and their masters in distant capitals, as well as invaders. Eventually, the social and demographic structures of the Levant were devastated by the Crusader wars.
What we aim to convey as condensed historical knowledge forms an entry point to understanding Syria's formation and its political development contexts, as current events are an extension and reproduction of the past. To such an extent that modern Syria's formation did not deviate from this pattern - wars contributed to shaping its structure, and its birth began with the war known as the "Arab Revolt," which was essentially an armed movement led by Arab Ottoman officers under the banner of Faisal bin Al-Hussein Sharif against the Ottoman Sultanate, while simultaneously maintaining an alliance with the British. Regardless of this war's implications and symbolism, it was a war led by a Hijazi family from outside Syria, serving as a clear indication of Syrian society's inability at that time to form a unified and strong civilian leadership that could speak for its communities to achieve independence and sovereignty.
Despite disagreements over the methodology of writing modern Syrian history, there remains a consensus that the civil and political aspects, as well as societal unity across Syrian regions, were virtually absent. Though this unity was achieved relatively during the resistance against French occupation/mandate for a brief period, this resistance was accompanied by lengthy debates over several fundamental issues such as inclusive Syrian identity and the transition from local governments to a central government in Damascus. Damascus served as Syria's capital during the years (1918-1920), then Aleppo became the capital of three federations, which were the statelets of Damascus, Aleppo, and the Alawites during the years (1920-1922).
However, it is certain that the agreement between Britain and Kemalist Turkey's government, along with President Shukri al-Quwatli's (1891-1967) experience and flexibility, helped establish Syria and Lebanon's map in its current form. Without the cooperation of political movements and influential figures in the regions east of the Euphrates with President Quwatli, the war in Al-Jazeera between insurgents and Damascus government police would not have ended. This uprising, which demanded independence/autonomy, continued between 1933 and 1946. In other words, it would have been difficult for the regions east of the Euphrates to join the modern Syrian state territorially and socially after the withdrawal of French and British forces in 1946, if not for the belief in societal commonalities and the pursuit of a national political partnership.
It is worth remembering that political life in Syria after independence was also a series of external and internal wars. The Palestine War erupted in 1948, from which internal power struggles derived. Military officers fought over power and disagreed on armament methods while paying lip service to the crucial cause of reclaiming Palestine. These differences manifested in internal conflicts within army factions and exploded with the Kurdish officer Husni al-Za'im's coup in 1949, seizing power in Damascus in the first military coup. During his movement and era, the violent power struggle intensified, taking on national, sectarian, and regional Syrian colors. Within months, al-Za'im himself was overthrown and immediately executed along with the Prime Minister, the civilian legal scholar Dr. Muhsin al-Barazi, both of whom were notables from the city of Hama.
The event was so bloody and had such a nationalist political conflict background that some Damascus newspapers announced at the time: "the end of Kurdish rule in Damascus." On this occasion, while respecting all opinions and courtesies that describe Syria's history as a journey of harmony, love, and accord, we believe that political conflicts were raging among the ruling elites along nationalist, sectarian, and regional lines from the very first days of independence, and even before. These continued until Hafez al-Assad's rise to power in 1970, which gave internal political violence and its wars an even more dangerous dimension, leading to absolute rule through executing his opponents and completely monopolizing power and national resources. The repressive apparatus, which he expanded and enlarged, became so brutal that it simultaneously deformed and preyed upon Syrian society. After his death, his son Bashar inherited power in 2000 with explicit support from the United States (which expressed its position and explicit desire for a smooth transfer of power from father to son). Another dangerous turn and development occurred in the course of the Syrian civil war that had been smoldering under the ashes, erupting as a result of the oppression of Syrian communities and in response to the Arab Spring variables, as well as external interventions and conflicts after 2011.
Despite the bloodiness of the conflict, the brutality of the repression, and its long duration, neither the military nor civilian opposition forces were able to decide the battle and overcome the regime until recent days. The battle led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies (in the Military Operations Management under the title of Deterring Aggression) was decisive, beginning on November 26th until the regime's fall and the defeat of its leaders at dawn on December 8th, 2024. The entire world was astonished by this quick and decisive result of the battle, and many observers now consider it the final episode in the Syrian war that has continued for decades. Are they right? Will that be achieved? What is the degree of success in opening a new page for civil peace and establishing a civilian system? These are the urgent questions today that every Syrian articulates among dozens of questions.
Whatever the case, and before contributing to the answer as an initial assessment, the distinction of this lightning battle lies in that it represents an unprecedented political achievement in modern Syrian history. Regardless of the circumstances, the degree of various parties' sponsorship of the power transition process, and efforts to create common ground between active forces within Syria and prevent neighboring countries' intervention, concerns still surround the political transition process led by HTS and its hastily formed government under Mohammed Al-Bashir's presidency.
What's important for the politically astute reader, and for those who approach this momentous event with a complex and dynamic mindset, is that this change occurred as the fruit of accumulated political struggles over half a century, and as a result of the tireless work of generations of Syrian activists who sacrificed everything precious - lives and wealth - to change this authoritarian regime. It's also important to objectively evaluate the process of uprooting the authoritarian regime from its foundations, recognizing its exceptional political significance. The transitional nature of HTS and its allies' assumption of power under Ahmed Al-Shara's leadership must be understood, as their success is summarized in ending one of the worst military, authoritarian, chauvinistic, and sectarian regimes in the region and the world. However, the legitimate question remains about the new authority's ability to simultaneously end the Syrian wars and plant the seeds of civil peace. Will this battle truly be the conclusion of the Syrian wars or the beginning of a series of new ones?
Undoubtedly, the transitional phase is extremely complex, and the Syrian tragedy is unparalleled worldwide. Therefore, success in ending the Syrian wars requires building on proven fundamentals such as the rule of law, respecting the uniqueness and diversity of local communities, working to secure their rights including the right to self-governance, as well as establishing public freedoms and maintaining human rights. This is difficult to achieve currently, unless the transitional phase leadership is formed from national elites - half wise men and half angels - meaning the necessity of combining honest national expertise with clean and noble political elites who rise above sharp polarization and hatred. Such individuals are abundantly available in Syrian communities. Otherwise, the compass points to the battle for toppling power in Damascus being merely the first Syrian war on a path of long turmoil that will destroy what remains of the country and displace the other segments of society. It will be the beginning of internal conflicts that will only end with the complete ruin of the country, transforming it into barren land and perhaps relatively achieving the saying: "a land without people."
Azad Ahmed Ali is a Kurdish researcher from Syria and author of dozens of books in Arabic and Kurdish. He received his PhD in the History of Engineering from Aleppo University and was head of Rudaw Research Center from 2014 to 2017. He has served as editor-in-chief of Al-Hiwar magazine since 1993.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
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