David Schenker discusses Iraqi elections, future of US in country

The below is a transcript of an interview by Rudaw’s Bestoon Khalid with David Schenker, Former United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, on Friday.

Rudaw: David, thank you very much for joining me. Last time you were here, it was in December 2020, almost one year ago, and before that it was in January to 2020, just days after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani and al-Muhandis.

Back then, in an interview, you told Kurdish media that the ball was in Iran's courts and you said the US is waiting to see what is Iran is going to do from an American point of view from Washington, D.C. How do you evaluate how did Iran play with the ball?

David Schenker: Well, first of all, it's a pleasure to be with you again, it's been been a long time, but I'm happy to be back. Listen, I think that for the remainder of the Trump administration, I think the Iranians understood that there would be enormous consequences for killing Americans. And after their retaliatory strike against Ain al-Asaad and Erbil, things calmed down.

I think we have started to see at the beginning of the Biden administration an uptick in Iranian provocation, testing the metal of the Biden administration, and that has fluctuated on and off, including, of course, attacks against the U.S. installations in Iraq that have been somewhat occurring periodically.

Now we are sitting at the nuclear table, the negotiating table with the Iranians, and I think they are at the same time looking for maximum pressure against the United States by enriching and Fordow, et cetera. But by and large, I think we're looking at, you know, a status quo situation. But I think that could change any time the Iranians don't appear particularly interested in getting a return to the nuclear agreement with the international community.

I see. And how about the role of the United States in Iraq, if you compare the role of the United States in Iraq back then when you were in office and today, what would you tell me when you do this comparison?

Well, listen, I think that American installations are continued to be targeted by Iranian proxies, but the United States remains committed partner to the government of Iraq, and we remain there on the ground both diplomatically and militarily. I think that the U.S. presence has helped in a way to for Iraqis to try and carve out their own sovereignty.

We saw the election results, I think, were quite remarkable that the Iraqi people neither voted for the United States nor for Iranian hegemony. In fact, they voted against these Iranian-backed Shiite militia for an Iraqi who the United States doesn't particularly agree with Muqtada al-Sadr, but somebody who represents neither an alliance with the United States nor subjugation at the hands of the Iranians. So it'll be interesting how this plays out. But I think it's actually the Iraqi people have spoken quite clearly about how they see their vision for the future, and that is that they want sovereignty and they think that very much is in the U.S. interest.

Who would be someone who has some sort of affiliation with the United States that did not get a vote from the Iraqis?

Well, listen, I don't want to go into individuals, but I think if you're looking at the coalition, that's going to move forward, whether al-Kadhimi will be, you know, return as the premier, whether Mohammed al-Halbousi will return the speaker of Parliament. People like a good job. I think there's a chance they will return.

Yeah, you told me the people of Iraq did not vote for the pro-Iranian and pro-Americans. You used other words, but the same meaning. So who are the pro-Americans that the people of Iraq did not vote for? That's my question.
 
No, I don't want to go and pick, you know, single out individuals, but I'm talking about writ large that you have a parliament. The breakdown of the votes. This is going to be either yet another coalition government which may not be able to move forward in a way that is productive or perhaps a majority government with opposition, which would be an interesting development in Iraq. But you know, the majority the party has got the largest number of votes is neither for the United States nor for Iran. And I think that's an interesting development.

I see. Ok, talking about the role of the United States in Iraq. Let me ask you this way. Is the US as effective as it used to be when you were in office and today? Does the US have enough power and effect on the ground in Iraq today, as it had during your term?

Well, listen, we're one year or so into the Biden administration. I think that this administration is a little more reticent to use force to deter Iran from provocation and aggression against Americans and its partners in Iraq. Nonetheless, this administration appears to be showing commitment to Iraq, followed through, I think, very well in support for the elections and the process. So I can't say whether the Trump administration was so much better than the Biden administration.

I don't think I want to get into that. But I think, you know, the Trump administration certainly succeeded in Iraq maintaining the U.S. presence, killing Qassem Suleimani, remaining in Iraq and then having an election a year later, where once again, I think the elections speak, the results speak for themselves.

I see this commitment to stay in Iraq, to stay partners with Iraq. There have been a lot of questions about this inside Iraq and also inside Kurdistan after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. But like in most, like in most of their statements, the Americans reassure Iraq that the US is not going to leave Iraq, and what we saw in Afghanistan is not going to happen in Iraq. Even Brett McGurk, when he was here last month, he mentioned this, and they always tell us that Iraq is different from Afghanistan.

Can you tell me why and how Iraq is different from Afghanistan for the United States of America? Remembering that years ago, the same statements, from the US were told for Afghanistan. The US reassured Afghans many times that the US is not going to leave the Afghanis. And they are committed to staying in Afghanistan and partnered with the Afghanistan government. Tell me what's different between the two countries and how should the people here in Kurdistan and Iraq believe in this world of commitment?

Well, I can't speak for this administration. What I would tell you is that I think there was a growing consensus that we were never going to be able to achieve what we wanted and set out to achieve in Afghanistan that we continue to spend blood and treasure. Even people who disagreed about the withdrawal, I think smart people in the United States could debate whether the presence was going to be in the long term productive.

To be sure, our presence prevented the fall of Kabul and protected half the population from being subjugated by the Taliban. But whether we could actually succeed without having this enormous commitment indefinitely in Afghanistan, I think was a subject of debate here in Washington. Iraq, we also spent enormous amounts of blood and treasure to try and help Iraq to succeed in being a sovereign and democratic state. And I think that its proximity to so many other of our allies in the region, the really essential necessity of contesting the space with Iran, that is that we have to be present. We have to help Iraq to stand on its own two feet so it can be sovereign and not be subjugated by Iran. I think that these are compelling arguments for the United States. The progress that we made in helping to build institutions. 

Certainly, there's an endemic problem of corruption in Iraq that needs to be worked out, but that there are signs that that democracy is taking root and has a chance of success in Iraq and the long term. And I think that if the United States wants to remain in the Middle East and I think there is a consensus here that even though there is this pivot to Asia, that we will need to have an enduring presence in the region for our friends, the continued flow of resources to stand by allies, that having a relationship with Iraq, with the people of Iraq and enabling Iraq to stand on its own two feet and be a sovereign state is an important part of that strategy and policy.

And on January 1, 2022. What are we going to see? What is this withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq? Can you just tell me what image should we expect to see?

I think we've seen in the past two or three strategic dialogues, the first one, which I believe was part of back during the Trump administration a few months before the administration left, included in, I think all the communiques of those strategic dialogues that this is a train and equip forces, that it is not a combat force. Now for groups like the Hashd al-Shaabi, any US military presence is unacceptable. But I think the government of Iraq and the vast majority of Iraqis recognize that our mission there at the request of the Iraqi government is to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. And we'll talk about that, I'm sure, in a few minutes.

But absent US support for the Iraqi military, for the counterterrorism forces, this would be, I think, very difficult. And so these are not combat forces already. And you can talk to, I think, General McKenzie, the head of Central Command. There will be a certain number of US forces in Iraq. We have the United States has consolidated the presence and is has been focused on this train and equip mission for some time.

The partnership between the US and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, in fact, last week, the Global Posture Review was released and there are some clues that this partnership is going to continue for the next year. And as we are expecting for the NDAA, maybe in some days the financial support is also going to continue for Peshmerga forces. Do you think that this partnership and financial support will continue?

 
And talking about defeating of ISIS. Last week, we heard at least four reports of ISIS attacks on Peshmerga forces, and many Peshmerga servicemen and civilians were murdered during the last seven or eight days. There is an understanding that the response from the United States and the coalition forces have been very slow to help Peshmerga forces fight against the ISIS militants, which attack Peshmerga forces and Kurdish villages. How do you evaluate this?

Well, it is certainly a plus-up from 2021. I think the request for next year is something like 280 million dollars, including two 240 million dollars in stipends for the Peshmerga, as well as 35 million dollars of other equipment and five million dollars for four drone purchases. I think this reflects the importance that the United States ascribes to its partnership with the Kurds, with the Peshmerga, how important that is for the enduring defeat of ISIS. 

I think over the years, there's been some discussion about whether U.S. taxpayers should be paying the salaries indefinitely of a foreign army or a foreign partner army. And right now, you can see we're not doing that even for the Lebanese armed forces who are asking us to help them pay their salaries because of the devaluation of the Lebanese lira. The salaries are now worth 10 percent of what they were a year and a half ago, and we generally don't do that.

There are some mechanisms for that for DOD, and they've made a, I think, you know, a special allowance for the Kurds. It would be good, I think, in the long term to see the Peshmerga be able to through the KRG and the central government of Baghdad, be able to pay the salaries of its own army…the relationship and the sustainment of the force.

So from your answer, what I understand is we are not going to see the Americans fighting against ISIS, neither on the ground, not on the ground, neither from air like air forces in upcoming weeks or months. Although ISIS is much more effective in the line between the KRG and the Iraqi army these days.

No, I think that this is a very important point, I think that the coordination between the Iraqi federal areas and the Kurdish region has not been great. And there are seem areas where ISIS has capitalized on, and I would venture to say I'm not in the government anymore, but this is something that the U.S. is encouraging Baghdad and the Kurdish region to fix. That is to better coordinate on how to secure and cover these “seem” areas that were ISIS's exploiting security vacuums. But this is once again for the Iraqi government and the Kurdish region to work together. 

We can help facilitate that. The United States is great at coming up with solutions to these things, but we know in the past these relations between Baghdad and Erbil haven't always been easy. But this requires, I think, much more coordination between you and Baghdad.

Transcribed by Sarkawt Mohammed

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